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1 Introduction
This paper sets an endogenous fertility model with human capital accumulation. Subsequently,
an examination is made of how child-care policies financed by a consumption tax affect fertility,
educational investment for children, and each generation’s welfare. Financing a social security
system based on a consumption tax is a policy that is considered in some developed countries
with an aging society with fewer children. In Japan, the national tax burden for basic pension
benefit is raised. Then the consumption tax rate is raised.1 However, if an aging society is
progressing, then the share of older people among the total population is increasing. The social
security burden per capita has risen drastically. To alleviate this situation, the government
should raise the future generation’s population size. The increase in the social security burden
will ease if the progress of an aging society halts.
[Insert Fig.1 around here.]
In France and Sweden, child-care policies are actively provided. Because of active child-
care policies, fertility rates in France and Sweden are maintained at an appropriately high
level. In contrast, the fertility rate in Japan remains at a low level because child-care policies
are negatively provided compared with France and Sweden and because child-care service is
insufficiently supported. Child care support policies to decrease child-care costs are necessary
to increase fertility. Our paper presents consideration of educational investment for children.
[Insert Fig.2 around here.]
Expenditures for educational investment are important to explain why fertility decreases.
Our paper presents consideration of child-care policies of two types: one for a child allowance
that is provided proportionally for the number of children in a family and the other for a
subsidy for investment in education. In France and Sweden, subsidies for education investment
are actively provided, too. In these countries, education costs that households pay are low.
1In Japan, the consumption tax rate is pulled up to 8% and finally reaches to 10% in 2015 in governmental
schedules. It is discussed how the government should use revenue with an increase in consumption tax rate for
social security benefit.
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Moreover, the cost of having children is low. Therefore, a decrease in the number of children
stops. However, negative child-care policies exist, such as high education costs that households
pay and insufficiently provided child-care services. Therefore, a rapidly aging society with fewer
children is progressing.
Our paper presents a derivation demonstrating that child allowances do not always increase
fertility because of decreased income growth. Child allowances reduce education investment for
children. Then human capital accumulation is prevented and income growth decreases. How-
ever, a subsidy for education investment can raise the rates of fertility and income growth. An
increase in income growth would provide sufficient tax revenues to provide social security bene-
fits. Therefore, a subsidy for educational investment should be adopted to resolve problems of
an aging society. Nevertheless, the government must consider social welfare when providing the
policies. With child-care policies financed by a consumption tax, the older generation’s welfare
necessarily decreases even if young and future generations’ welfare increases. In such a case,
Pareto-improving allocations are not achieved by child-care policies because child allowances
reduce income growth and decrease future generations’ welfare. However, if the government
provides an additional pension benefit financed by a consumption tax, then Pareto improving
allocations are achieved. Therefore, considering social welfare, an additional pension is best. In
addition, giving a subsidy for education investment is useful to stop an aging society.
The remainder of the paper is presented as follows. Section 2 shows related literature. The
model economy is set in section 3, followed by examination of how additional pension and child-
care policies affect welfare, fertility, and income growth in section 4. Section 5 discusses another
means to finance for an additional pension. The final section concludes our paper.
2 Related Literature
Sleebos (2003) reports child-care policies and fertility in different countries. Intuitively, one
might expect that active child-care policies raise the fertility rate. That inference is supported
by reports from Laroque and Salanie (2005), showing that fertility is affected by a financial
incentive such as a child allowance. Many investigators have set an endogenous fertility model
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and have examined whether child allowances can raise fertility or not: Oshio (2001), van Groezen,
Leers and Meijdam (2003), Yasuoka (2006), van Groezen and Meijdam (2008), Fanti and Gori
(2009), Yasuoka and Goto (2011).
Education cost is an important consideration related to how fertility is determined. Many
reports in the literature present consideration of how fertility and the quality of children as
education investment are determined in terms of the quality and quantity of a child model:
Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990), Tamura (1994), Wigniolle (2002), de la Croix and Doepke
(2003, 2004) and Yakita (2010). Especially, Zhang (1995, 1997), Zhang and Casagrande (1998),
and Yasuoka and Miyake (2014) set an endogenous fertility with human capital accumulation
and examine how child-care policies such as child allowances and a subsidy for education affect
fertility and income growth rates.
Optimal pension, tax, and child-care policies have been examined by some studies. Zhang
and Zhang (2007) and Hirazawa and Yakita (2009) derive an optimal pension policy in an
endogenous fertility model. Van Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003), van Groezen and Meijdam
(2008) and Yasuoka and Goto (2011) derive optimal pensions and child allowances. Cremer,
Gahvari and Pestieau (2011) examine optimal child allowances and education subsidy to hold
first best allocations. Our paper considers Pareto-improving allocations with consumption tax
and examines whether each generation’s welfare is pulled up by the policies or not.
Galor and Weil (1996) derive that fertility is negatively correlated with income because of
the opportunity cost of having children. However, this negative relation changes to a positive
one, as shown by Day (2012). Child-care services are regarded as bringing about a positive
relation (Apps and Lees (2004), Ferrero and Iza (2004), Yasuoka and Miyake (2010) and Day
(2012)).
If one considers children as one kind of investment to produce children care in a later period,
then a pension system negatively affects the fertility rate (Nishimura and Zhang (1992), Zhang
and Zhang (1998), Wigger (1999), Zhang and Zhang (2004) and Oshio and Yasuoka (2009)).
However, if one considers children not as an investment, then the pension benefit positively
affects fertility, as derived in many papers. Pension benefits financed by a consumption tax
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are examined by Lin and Tian (2003). Our paper presents an examination not only of pension
reform but also of child care policies financed by a consumption tax.
Our paper is closely related to Peters (1995) and Meier and Wrede (2010). Peters (1995)
sets an endogenous fertility and education investment model with pay-as-you-go pension and
examines the tax policy and subsidy policy for children to achieve welfare maximizing solution.
Meier and Wrede (2010) consider the pension model and derive child care policy to raise the
welfare by internalizing externality for pension benefit.
Our paper also considers how the child care policies and pension policy affect the fertility,
pension benefit and welfare. However, our paper is different from these two quoted ones in the
following points. Peters (1995) examines the welfare analysis at the steady state and derives
the optimal subsidy policy to achieve the welfare maximizing allocations. On the other hand,
our paper examines how the child allowance and the subsidy for the education investment affect
the fertility and the human capital of children. Moreover, our paper examines whether the
policies can bring about Pareto improving or not. Meier and Wrede (2010) consider the pension
incentive policy as the policy to raise the fertility and the education investment and derives how
the pension incentive policy affects the fertility and the education investment. In addition, first
best solution and second best solution are derived. Our paper considers the consumption tax to
finance the tax revenue. Peters (1995) and Meier and Wrede (2010) consider the income tax and
lump-sum tax. However, in an aging society, the consumption tax should be considered because
of intergenerational inequality.
Our paper considers three policies to raise the pension benefit: the policy of a direct increase
in pension benefit, the policy of an indirect increase in pension benefit by the child allowance
and the subsidy for the education investment. We compare three policies in terms of social
welfare, which is not considered by Peters (1995) and Meier and Wrede (2010).
3 The Model
The model economy consists of a two-period (young and old) overlapping-generations model.
For these analyses, we assume a small open economy. Agents of three types exist: households,
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firms, and a government.
3.1 Households
Households experience two periods: young and old. During the young period, each household
supplies labor inelastically to earn labor income. Households are concerned about the quantity
of children, the quality of children (which depends on educational investment), and consumption
during the young and old period. Households must save to consume during the old period. In
addition to household behavior, the government levies a labor income tax to provide pension
benefits. Moreover, the government levies a consumption tax to provide an additional pension
benefit, a child allowance, and a subsidy for education investment. Pension benefits are provided
for older people, but a child allowance and an educational subsidy are provided for younger
people. The household’s lifetime budget constraint is therefore shown as
(1 + τc)c1t +
(1 + τc)c2t+1
1 + rt+1
+ (1− xt)etnt + (zt − qt)nt = (1− τ)wtht + pt+11 + rt+1 . (1)
Therein, c1t and c2t+1 respectively denote consumption during the young period and during the
old period. nt represents the number of children. In addition, rt+1 represents an interest rate,
wt and ht denote the wage rate per unit of effective labor and human capital, et shows education
investment, τ and τc respectively represent the labor income tax rate and the consumption tax
rate (0 < τ < 1 and 0 < τc are assumed.), and zt denotes the child-care cost. The government
provides qt unit of child allowance for a child. A child allowance qt is assumed qt < zt. Here, xt
denotes the subsidy rate for educational investment (0 < xt < 1 is assumed). Older people can
receive pension benefit pt+1.
A household’s utility function ut is given as follows 2
ut = α lnntht+1 + β ln c1t + (1− α− β) ln c2t+1, 0 < α, 0 < β,α+ β < 1. (2)
The children’s human capital ht+1 is assumed according to the following equation.
ht+1 = γeth
1−
t , 0 < γ, 0 <  < 1 (3)
2Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) assumed that parents care about educational investment for their children.
However, de la Croix (2003) and others assumed that parents care about children’s future income ht+1 instead of
et. As shown by one analysis (3) and another by de la Croix and Doepke (2003), children’s future income depends
on educational investment. Therefore, the assumption of a utility function (2) here is nearly equivalent to that
in a model described by de la Croix and Doepke (2003).
6
A household chooses consumption during young and old life c1t, c2t+1 and chooses educational
investment for children (quality of children) et and fertility (quantity of children) nt to maximize
lifetime utility (2) subject to the lifetime budget constraint (1) and human capital accumulation
(3). The first-order condition derives the following equations.
c1t =
β
1 + τc
(
(1− τ)wht + pt+11 + rt+1
)
, (4)
c2t+1 =
(1 + r)(1− α− β)
1 + τc
(
(1− τ)wht + pt+11 + rt+1
)
, (5)
nt =
α(1− )
zt − qt
(
(1− τ)wht + pt+11 + rt+1
)
, (6)
et =
zt − qt
1− xt

1−  . (7)
3.2 Firms
Our paper assumes firms of two types. One firm produces final goods. Final goods are produced
by a production function y = f(k), f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0. y and k respectively denote the final
goods per labor input and the capital per labor input. These analyses assume a small open
economy. Then, considering that a competitive market and a world interest rate are given, an
interest rate r and w are determined using a world interest rate.
Next, we consider the child-care service market. The aggregate child-care service Yt is
produced by Yt = ρLct , and ρ > 0 and L
c
t denote the labor input for child-care services.
3
Denoting wct as the wage rate of child-care service, the profit function pit is
pit = ztρLct − wctLct . (8)
Profit maximization reduces to zt =
wct
ρ . Assuming free labor mobility between the final goods
sector and child-care service sector, the wage rate wct is given as w
c
t = wht. Thereby, we obtain
zt = zˆwht, where zˆ = 1ρ .
3.3 Government
The government provides a pension benefit for older people. The pension benefit is financed by
taxation for a wage income that younger people gains, i.e., the pension system in our paper is
3This function is assumed by Yasuoka and Miyake (2010) and by Day (2012).
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a pay-as-you-go system. Then, the pension benefit is shown as
pt+1 = τwntht+1 + p¯t+1. (9)
p¯t+1 denotes an additional pension benefit financed by a consumption tax. Moreover, the gov-
ernment provides an additional pension benefit, a child allowance and a subsidy for education
investment, which are financed by a consumption tax. The budget constraint is show as
τc
(
c1t +
c2t
nt−1
)
= qtnt +
p¯t
nt−1
+ xtetnt. (10)
4 Policy Effect
This section presents examination of whether an additional pension, child allowance, or education
subsidy can increase each generation’s utility or not. These social security benefits are financed
by a consumption tax.
4.1 Additional Pension Benefit
The government provides an additional pension benefit financed by a consumption tax. An
additional pension benefit is assumed by p¯t = pˆwht. Then, considering qt = xt = 0, the
government budget constraint for any t period is shown as p¯tnt−1 = τc
(
c1t + c2tnt−1
)
, that is,
pˆwht
nt−1
=
τc
1 + τc
(
β(1 + g) +
(1 + r)(1− α− β)
nt−1
)(
(1− τ)wht−1 + pt1 + r
)
, (11)
where 1 + g = ht+1ht . Completely differentiating by pˆ and τc at the approximation of τc = 0, we
obtain the following equation:
dpˆ
dτc
=
(
βn+
(1 + r)(1− α− β)
1 + g
)(
1− τ + τn
1 + r
)
. (12)
Because of a positive sign of dpˆdτc , an increase in consumption tax raises an additional pension
benefit. An additional pension raises fertility because an increase in pension benefits raises the
household’s lifetime income.
dn
dpˆ
=
α(1− )
1 + r
1
zˆ − α(1−)τ(1+g)1+r
=
n(1 + g)
(1 + r)(1− τ) (13)
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Investment in education is not changed by an additional pension. An income growth rate given
by the human capital growth rate is shown as
1 + g = γ
(
wzˆ
1− 
)
. (14)
We derive the condition by which an additional pension benefit can bring about Pareto-improving
allocations for every generation. First, we examine how an additional pension benefit affects
the young and future generation’s utility. Substituting (4)–(6) and (14) into (2), we obtain the
young generation’s utility as
uyt = lnn+α ln(1+g)−(1−α) ln(1+τc)+lnht+β ln
βzˆw
α(1− )+(1−α−β) ln
(1 + r)(1− α− β)zˆw
α(1− ) .
(15)
We define uyt as the utility accruing to the young generation at t period and u
o
t as the utility
accruing to the older generation at t period. In addition, ut+j (1 ≤ j) is defined as the utility
accruing to a young generation at t + j. We consider ut+j as the future generation’s utility.
Completely differentiating by uyt , τc and n at approximation of τc = 0 for given ht, we obtain
duyt
dτc
and the young generation’s utility increases as long as the following inequality holds.
duyt
dτc
=
1
n
dn
dτc
− (1− α) > 0. (16)
Although the consumption tax reduces consumption in each period and the utility, an additional
pension benefit can raise the level of utility. Considering (12), (13), and (16), we obtain the
condition of raising the younger generation’s utility.
n >
α(1− α)(1− )(1− τ)(1 + r)
zˆ
(
βn+ (1+r)(1−α−β)1+g
) . (17)
Defining nyp as fertility n to hold n =
α(1−α)(1−)(1−τ)(1+r)
zˆ
(
βn+
(1+r)(1−α−β)
1+g
) , nyp < n signifies an increase in the
young generation’s utility, as shown in Fig. 3. L and R denote the left-hand-side and the
right-hand-side of (20). This condition is adopted for any future generation.
[Insert Fig.3 around here.]
Secondly, we examine how an additional pension affects the older generation’s utility. Being
different from younger people, a consumption tax does not exist in the younger period and
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consumption is levied for consumption in the older period. Then, the older generation’s utility
is shown as
uot = lnn−(1−α−β) ln(1+τc)+(1−α) lnht−1+β ln
βwzˆ
α(1− )+(1−α−β) ln
(1 + r)(1− α− β)zˆw
α(1− ) .
(18)
Completely differentiating by uot , τc and n at approximation of τc = 0 for given ht−1, we obtain
duot
dτc
. Then the older generation’s utility increases as long as the following inequality holds.
duot
dτc
=
1
n
dn
dτc
− (1− α− β) > 0 (19)
An additional pension raises the older generation’s utility if the positive effect of an additional
pension on the utility is greater than the negative effect by a consumption tax. Considering
(12), (13), and (19), we obtain the condition to raise the younger generation’s utility.
n >
α(1− α− β)(1− )(1− τ)(1 + r)
zˆ
(
βn+ (1+r)(1−α−β)1+g
) . (20)
Defining nop ≡ α(1−α−β)(1−)(1−τ)(1+r)zˆ(βn+ (1+r)(1−α−β)
1+g
) , nop < n means an increase in the older generation’s utility.
Moreover, we find nop < n
y
p. Consequently, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 1 With nyp < n, an additional pension benefit financed by a consumption tax
can raise every generation’s utility, i.e., Pareto improvement is brought about.
With nop < n < n
y
p, an additional pension increases the older generation’s utility and de-
creases the younger generation and future generations’ utility. If the fertility rate is higher, an
additional pension financed by a consumption tax is larger, as shown by (12). Therefore, given
high fertility, every generation’s utility increases and Pareto improving allocations are achieved.
For the reason that we obtain nop < n
y
p, the older generation does not pay a consumption tax for
the younger period. Because the older generation’s tax burden is not heavy, compared with the
young and future generations, the older generation’s utility increases even if the younger and
future generations’ utility decreases.
In developed countries, an aging society is progressing. Because of a numerical decrease in
younger generations, the social security benefit financed by a consumption tax increases. Even
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if a consumption tax raises the pension benefit, the welfare level falls as long as the fertility rate
is low.
4.2 Child Allowance
This subsection presents an examination of the effects on welfare of a child allowance financed by
a consumption tax. Child allowances financed by a consumption tax reduce the older generation’s
utility at t period if the government levies a consumption tax at t period. Child allowances raise
fertility at t + j period. Therefore, for the older generation at t period, only the consumption
tax is levied. Their utility decreases and no Pareto improving allocation can be achieved.
For the younger generation at t period and future generations, child allowances can raise
fertility. Considering (3) and (6), income growth and fertility with child allowances are shown
as
1 + g = γ
(
w(zˆ − qˆ)
1− 
)
,
n =
α(1− )(1− τ)
zˆ − qˆ τα(1−)(1+g)1+r
. (21)
Child allowances are assumed by qt+j = qˆwht+j , (0 ≤ j). Then, considering pˆ = xt = 0, the
government budget constraint with child allowances qt+jn = τc
(
c1t+j +
c2t+j
n
)
is shown as
qˆwht+jn =
τc
1 + τc
(
β(1 + g) +
(1 + r)(1− α− β)
n
)(
(1− τ)wht+j−1 + τnwht+j1 + r
)
. (22)
Completely differentiating (21)–(23) with n, 1 + g, τc, qˆ at the approximation of τc = 0, we find
the effect of child allowances on fertility and income growth, as demonstrated below.
dn
dqˆ
=
n
(
1− τα(1−)(1+g)zˆ(1+r)
)
zˆ − τα(1−)(1+g)1+r
, (23)
dg
dqˆ
= −(1 + g)
zˆ
< 0 (24)
Child allowances decrease the income growth rate because households decrease education invest-
ment that is more expensive than the cost of increasing the number of children. The fertility
rate does not always increase. With τ < zˆ(1+r)α(1−)(1+g) , we obtain
dn
dqˆ > 0.
dqˆ
dτc
is given as
dqˆ
dτc
=
zˆ
α(1− )
(
β +
(1 + r)(1− α− β)
(1 + g)n
)
. (25)
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The younger generation or future generation’s utility is shown as follows:
ut+j = lnn+ (j + α) ln(1 + g) + (1− α) ln(zˆ − qˆ)− (1− α) ln(1 + τc)
+ lnht + β ln
βw
α(1− ) + (1− α− β) ln
(1 + r)(1− α− β)w
α(1− ) . (26)
Therein, ut+j at j = 0 means u
y
t , which is the younger generation’s utility at t period. With
1 ≤ j, ut+j denotes the future generation’s utility. Completely differentiating (27) by ut+j ,n,g, τc,
and qˆ at the approximation of τc = 0, we obtain
dut+j
dτc
as
dut+j
dτc
=
(
1
n
dn
dqˆ
+
j + α
1 + g
dg
dqˆ
− 1− α
zˆ
)
dqˆ
dτc
> 1− α. (27)
With dut+jdτc > 0, child allowances financed by a consumption tax raise the utility. The condition
is shown as
nzˆ
(
1− τα(1−)(1+g)zˆ(1+r)
)
(1− )(1− τ) >
α(1− α)(1− )
β + (1+r)(1−α−β)(1+g)n
+ (1− α) + (j + α). (28)
We try explaining how each generation’s utility changes. We assume that τ < zˆ(1+r)α(1−)(1+g) as
a positive sign of the left-hand-side of (28). The left-hand-side and the right-hand-side show
an increase effect and a decrease effect on utility by child allowances. The first term of the
right-hand-side shows a decrease in income growth by child allowances. The second term shows
a decrease in c1t+jnt+j and
c2t+j+1
nt+j
. The third term shows a consumption tax burden. Fertility to
hold inequality (28) is depicted in Fig. 4.
[Insert Fig.4 around here.]
In these analyses, Lq and Rq respectively denote the left-hand-side and the right-hand-side of
inequality (28). Defining nq as fertility to equalize (28), then nq < n brings about an increase in
the utility of j generation. nq increases with j. Then, even if the younger generation and some
future generation’s utility increase by virtue of low nq, more future generation’s utility might
decrease because of high nq. Consequently, nq < n holds only to a slight degree.
With τ > zˆ(1+r)α(1−)(1+g) , no fertility exists for inequality (28). Then, every generation’s utility
decreases. The following proposition is established.
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Proposition 2 Child allowances financed by a consumption tax always reduce the older gen-
eration’s utility. With nq < n and τ <
zˆ(1+r)
α(1−)(1+g) , j generation’s utility increases. However,
because nq increases with j, the future generation’s utility decreases more because nq < n is
only slightly held. However, τ > zˆ(1+r)α(1−)(1+g) lowers every generation’s utility.
Child allowances increase fertility and decrease income growth. A decrease in income growth
reduces the young and future generations’ utility. For future generations, a decrease effect of
income growth on utility becomes large. Then, an increase in the fertility rate pulls up the utility
directly and indirectly via the pension benefit. However, as long as fertility with child allowances
is constant over time, the negative effect prevails. With τ > zˆ(1+r)α(1−)(1+g) , both fertility and an
income growth decrease because of a decrease in pension benefits. Then, it goes without saying
that the utility necessarily decreases.
4.3 Subsidy for Education
This subsection presents an examination of how the subsidy for pension benefits affects each
generation’s utility. Similarly with child allowances, the older generation’s utility in t period
decreases because it has only a consumption tax burden with no subsidy benefit. Therefore, this
policy does not bring about Pareto-improving allocations because the older generation’s utility
necessarily decreases. Setting xt = x and considering pˆ = qˆ = 0, then the government budget
constraint is shown as
xetnt =
τc
1 + τc
(
β(1 + g) +
(1 + r)(1− α− β)
n
)(
(1− τ)wht+j−1 + nτwht+j1 + r
)
. (29)
Fertility and the income growth rate are
n =
α(1− )(1− τ)
zˆ − τα(1−)(1+g)1+r
, (30)
1 + g = γ
(
wzˆ
(1− )(1− x)
)
. (31)
With complete differentiation (29)–(31) done with n, g, x, τc at the approximation of x = 0, we
obtain the following equations:
dn
dx
=
nτα(1−)(1+g)
1+r
zˆ − τα(1−)(1+g)1+r
> 0, (32)
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dg
dx
= (1 + g) > 0. (33)
We obtain dxdτc as
dx
dτc
=
β + (1+r)(1−α−β)(1+g)n
α
> 0. (34)
The young generation or future generation’s utility is shown as
ut+j = lnn+ (j + α) ln(1 + g)− (1− α) ln(1 + τc)
+ lnht + β ln
βzˆw
α(1− ) + (1− α− β) ln
(1 + r)(1− α− β)zˆw
α(1− ) . (35)
With j = 0, ut denotes the younger generation’s utility at t period. With 1 ≤ j, ut+j denotes
the future generation’s utility. Completely differentiating (36) by ut+j , n, g, x and τc for given
ht, we obtain
dut+j
dτc
as
dut+j
dx
=
(
1
n
dn
dx
+
j + α
1 + g
dg
dx
)
dx
dτc
− (1− α). (36)
The condition to have dut+jdx > 0 is
nτ(1 + g)
(1 + r)(1− τ) + (j + α) >
α(1− α)
β + (1+r)(1−α−β)(1+g)n
. (37)
The left-hand-side of (37) shows an increase effect on the utility. An educational subsidy in-
creases education investment and income growth. An increase in income growth raises fertility
because of an increase in pension and household income. The right-hand-side of (37) shows
a decreased effect on utility because a consumption tax exists. The utility increases by an
educational subsidy if this inequality holds.
We try explaining fertility to hold inequality (37) with Fig. 5.
[Insert Fig.5 around here.]
Lx and Rx denote the left-hand-side and the right-hand-side of (37), respectively. As shown
in Fig. 5, if fertility exists between n∗ and n∗∗, an education subsidy can not raise the utility.
Then, the negative effect of a consumption tax burden on the utility is large. Why can n < n∗
and n > n∗∗ raise the utility? n > n∗∗ signifies that fertility is large and that the pension
benefit increased by income growth increases more. n < n∗ signifies that the fertility rate is low.
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However, because of high child care costs, zˆ lowers the fertility rate. However, with high zˆ, an
additional education subsidy is magnified. Then, the effect of an increase in pension benefits is
large and the utility is raised.
An educational subsidy always increases the utility if L is depicted as a dashed line. The
left-hand-side increases with j because of income growth. Then, even if the younger generation’s
and some future generations’ utility decrease, the future generation’s utility increases. Our paper
shows that every generation’s utility, except for that of the older generation, increases because of
an education subsidy. Considering (37) at j = 0, we consider the following quadratic equations:
(1 + g)τβ
(1 + r)(1− τ)n
2 +
(
τ
1− τ − α
)
(1− α− β)n+ α(1 + r)(1− α− β)
1 + g
= 0. (38)
Then, the following inequality holds, and every generation’s utility except for that of the old
generation, increases. (
τ
1− τ − α
)2
(1− α− β) < 4αβτ
1− τ (39)
Then, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 3 Apart from child allowances, an education subsidy can raise every generation’s
utility except for the older generation if (39) holds.
Both child allowances and an education subsidy are provided only for young and future
generations. However, child allowances necessarily decrease future generations’ utility because
of a decrease in income growth. In contrast, an education subsidy can raise every generation’s
utility except for that of the older generation. Therefore, an education subsidy should be selected
in terms of welfare.
5 Discussion
Child allowances and an education subsidy financed by a consumption tax decrease the older
generation’s utility. Therefore, the Pareto-improving allocations are achieved only by an ad-
ditional pension financed by consumption if the fertility rate is higher than nyp. We consider
an increase in τ as another means to finance additional pension benefits. Defining τˆ as the
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contribution rate before providing an additional pension and completely differentiating by uyt , n,
and τ at the approximation of τ = τˆ , we obtain du
y
t
dτ =
1
n
dn
dτ .
dn
dτ as
dn
dτ
=
α(1− )
zˆ
n(1+g)
1+r − 1
1− α(1−)τ(1+g)zˆ
. (40)
With n > 1+r1+g , the young generation’s utility increases. This is Aaron condition.
4 Then, the
future generation’s utility increases, too. The older generation’s utility always increases because
of a lack of burden for an additional pension, as is known generally. We obtain both 1+r1+g > n
y
t
and 1+r1+g < n
y
t based on the parametric condition. With n
y
t < n <
1+g
1+r , Pareto improving
allocations are brought about by an increase in the contribution rate or labor income tax, not
a consumption tax. Even if an aging society is progressing and it is considered important for
financing by a consumption tax, an increase in the contribution rate or labor income tax rate is
desirable because such a policy can provide Pareto improvement.
In this case, an increase in τ raise the lifetime income and welfare. However, as shown by
(16) and (19), an increase in pension financed by the consumption tax can not raise the welfare
even if n > 1+r1+g . This result shows that the labor income taxation for only young generation is
different from the consumption tax for not only young generation but also old generation.
6 Conclusions
Our paper presents an examination of how additional tax revenues derived from a consumption
tax should be provided for social security benefits such as pension and child care policies. An
additional pension can raise every generation’s utility and can achieve Pareto-improving alloca-
tions. However, child-care policies such as child allowances and an education subsidy can raise
every generation’s utility, except for the older generation. Moreover, even if child allowances
raise the young and some future generation’s utility, future generations’ utility decreases because
of a decrease in income growth. However, with a parametric condition, an education subsidy
can always raise every generation’s utility except for that of the older generation because such
a subsidy can increase income growth. Results of our paper demonstrate that an additional
4Adema, Van Groezen and Meijdam (2009) explains Aaron condition.
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pension benefit financed by a consumption tax should be provided because Pareto-improving
allocations are brought about. Even if the government wants to provide child-care policies, an
education subsidy should be provided because child allowances decrease the future generations’
utility.
Finally, we compare an additional tax financed by a consumption tax with that financed
by a labor income tax. Although a consumption tax should be used to finance social security
benefits in an aging society, an additional pension financed by a consumption tax can not achieve
Pareto improving allocations if the fertility rate is low. Then, an additional pension financed by
a labor tax can achieve Pareto improvement. Therefore, the government should consider which
tax should be used for an additional pension.
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Fig. 1: Fertility (below the country) and Fiscal Support for Family (share of Gross Domes-
tic Product) (Data: OECD Social Expenditure Database (November 2008), A 2012 Declining
Birthrate White Paper (2012), Demographic Yearbook (UN) and Vital Statistics in Japan (Min-
istry of Health, Labour and Welfare (in Japan).) Data of Fiscal Support for Families are those
of 2007. Fiscal Support for Families includes benefits in kind (day-care/home help and other
benefits in kind) and cash benefits (family allowance, maternity and parental leave and other
cash benefits). Data of the total Fertility Rate are those of 2010.)
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Fig. 2: Ratio of Public and Private Education Expenditure to Gross Domestic Product
(GDP).
(Data: OECD (2010) Education at a Glance 2010. Data years are 2007. Fiscal Support
for Families includes in-kind benefits (day care, home help and other in-kind benefits) and cash
benefits (family allowance, maternity and parental leave, and other cash benefits).)
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Fig. 3 Fertility to hold Eq. (20).
n
Lq, Rq
Lq
Rq
nq
an increase in j
Fig. 4 Fertility to hold Eq. (28).
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Fig. 5 Fertility to hold Eq. (37).
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